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When Less is More: An Ideological Rhetorical Analysis of Selected ABA Standards on
Curricula and Faculty
Linda L. Berger ∗
Chapter 9 [excerpts only]
Rhetoric’s Critique
THE DOCTRINE/SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION'S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND
(Linda H. Edwards ed., Carolina Academic Press 2017)
http://www.cap-press.com/books/isbn/9781611636130/The-Doctrine-Skills-Divide

Editors’ Note:
This section of the book examines some of the negative entailments of our choice to
segregate doctrine and skills teaching. Chapter 9 provides a rhetorical critique of the
doctrine/skills divide and the ironic consequences of our response.

Sometimes a single phrase conveys the essence of a complex question. When it
adopted Interpretation 402-1—written to help evaluators determine whether law schools
were complying with its Standards on faculty-student ratio—the American Bar
Association (ABA) decided that only tenure-track faculty members should count as “one”
full faculty member while “additional teaching resources” would be counted as “less than
one.” More specifically, the ABA authors wrote, “clinicians and legal writing instructors
not on tenure track or its equivalent who teach a full load” would be counted as seventenths of one full faculty member. 1
The tone deafness of this proposition (reminiscent of the Constitution’s equation
for counting slaves as three-fifths of one free citizen) was matched by its irony. Because
they would be counted as “one” if they were converted to tenure-track positions, the
Interpretation was helpful to clinicians and legal writing professors. Despite the harmful
impression left by the offensive measure, the ironic reality was that the seven-tenths ratio
encouraged law schools to add more clinicians and legal writing professors to the tenure
track.
This example sets the stage for this chapter’s ideological rhetorical analysis of the
ABA standards on faculty and curricula. As the following analysis will demonstrate,
∗
Thank you to Linda Edwards, Melissa Weresh, and Richard Neumann for discussing the
concepts in this chapter with me; the mistakes that remain are mine. Thank you to Andrea Orwoll
for research assistance.
1 American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Standards for Approval of Law Schools (as of July 2014). After years of study, a number of
revisions, many of them technical, were approved in August 2014. See ABA, REVISED AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR REVISED STANDARDS
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, August 2014 (available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html).
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when we examine an historical text for its ideological implications, it is often difficult to
distinguish between situations in which the text reflected implicit ideological
commitments and those where the text explicitly created and perpetuated them. In most
cases, rhetorical critics conclude, the historical text has contributed in all three ways to
the further entrenchment of a dominant ideology. For the purposes of this analysis,
what’s most important about the seven-tenths standard is that it appeared to embody an
underlying set of beliefs and values that rationalized the subordination of some classes of
law school professors based on the subject matter of their courses or the method of their
teaching. For ABA reporting purposes, these professors actually were counted as seventenths rather than as “one” full professor. More powerful than that concrete result was the
lasting image: professors who specialized in clinical or legal writing teaching were not
fully citizens of the legal academy. In the language of the ABA Standards, torts
professors were recognized as “faculty members” (a group of people), while clinical and
legal writing professors were considered “teaching resources” along with computers and
books in the library.
There was no claim that these professors were not carrying a full teaching load, or
that they were not carrying their fair share of working with and counseling students, or
that they were not performing sufficient community or public service. So the lack of full
citizenship apparently was based on the lack of some other mark or merit among these
professors. Although no clear legislative history exists, many observers believed the
interpretation was the result of the largely implicit assumption that clinical and legal
writing professors would not be engaged in scholarship (in part because their teaching
loads were heavier than those of tenure-track professors) and so they should not count the
same as “one” full faculty member. This assumption was supported by pervasive and
powerful ideological commitments, including a commitment to the value of theoretical
legal scholarship as by far the most important part of the professor’s contributions to
legal education.
This chapter will undertake an ideological rhetorical analysis of several key
provisions of Chapters 3 and 4 of the ABA Standards, specifically, the interrelated
provisions that regulate the curriculum and specify the required conditions of
employment for the faculty of a law school. Many amendments have been made to those
chapters over the years, and in order to work with a non-moving target, this analysis will
focus on the version that was current as of July 2014, several years into the recognition
that the legal profession was changing and that legal education needed to reflect some of
those changes.
I.

The process of ideological rhetorical analysis

Ideologies are patterns or systems of beliefs, concepts, attitudes, values, and
assumptions. Members of a group use these patterns and systems to understand the world
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around them. When we buy into the resulting blueprints and networks, our commitments
to them serve three major purposes. 2
First, ideological commitments serve an “integrating” function. The influential
symbols and images we create and maintain help us to forge individual and group
identities and to integrate or constitute our understanding of the world consistent with
those identities. Second, by filling in gaps in our reasoning with the glue provided by
shared networks, ideological commitments “legitimate” existing authority and make the
current state of things seem natural and inevitable. Third, as a result of the integrating and
legitimating functions, our commitments to particular ideological systems “distort”
reality because they suppress the complexity of real-world situations. Through the
process of creating individual and group identities and legitimizing our resulting
perceptions of how things work, we view problems and challenges through a filter. As
these problems and challenges lose complexity and dimension, they become easier to
understand and to resolve. 3
An ideological rhetorical analysis allows the critic to examine the underlying
systems of beliefs and values that have influenced the creation, interpretation, and
revision of a rhetorical artifact or document: in this case, selected provisions of the ABA
Standards. More specifically, the ideologically-based rhetorical analysis is aimed at
discerning what beliefs and values were viewed as most important (or most privileged)
by the authors of the document being studied. 4 This is important because the privileged
ideology gains the “symbolic power to map or classify the world for others.” Used as a
filter or a frame, the “dominant ideology controls what participants see as natural or
obvious by establishing the norm. . . . A [governing] ideology provides a sense that things
are the way they have to be as it asserts that its meanings are the real, natural ones.” 5
To maintain its position, that is, to remain dominant, Sonja Foss writes that “a
[governing] ideology must be constructed, renewed, reinforced, and defended continually
through the use of rhetorical strategies and practices.” In addition to uncovering the
ideologies that dominate, the analysis can bring to the surface some of the rhetorical
techniques through which “resistance” to the dominant ideology is “muted.” For
example, questions about why certain classes of people are not paid equally with other
classes of people can be muted or suppressed by depicting those classes as lacking in the
qualifications relevant to the established norm.
Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law School, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 142-45 (2001) (relying on PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
(1986)).
3 As applied to the law school setting, Philip Kissam wrote that “[i]deology is most
important when it serves existing authority, law school faculties for example, by constructing
identities that resonate with this authority, by helping to legitimate the authority, and by
disguising or distorting aspects of reality that might be used to criticize existing authority.” Id. at
145.
4 When it comes to a rhetorical artifact such as the ABA Standards, there is obviously no
single author. My use of the term author is intended to refer to the authorship of the Standards by
various actors over time.
5 SONJA K. FOSS, RHETORICAL CRITICISM: EXPLANATION AND PRACTICE 295 (Waveland Press
3d ed. 2004).
2
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What follows in this chapter is a very abbreviated application of Sonja Foss’s
classic approach to ideological criticism combined with some aspects of Stuart Hall’s
theory of ideology. 6 It is designed to offer the beginnings of an “analysis that goes
beyond appearances and examines the underlying constraints and determinants of the
discourse.” 7 The chapter will follow the Foss approach, using these steps: first,
identifying the presented elements of the artifact (topics regulated by the Standards);
next, identifying the suggested elements (references, themes, allusions, and allied
concepts suggested by or linked with the presented elements); third, formulating the
underlying ideology (grouping suggested elements into categories and frameworks); and
finally, identifying the functions served by the ideology.
Under Foss’s approach, “[t]he primary components of an ideology are evaluative
beliefs—beliefs about which there are possible alternative judgments.” 8 Working in
tandem, Hall’s approach is aimed at revealing the existence of alternatives by bringing
attention to assumed connections and disturbing them.
From Hall’s perspective, the ideological moment occurs when everybody knows
what something is without needing any further explanation. Our acceptance of such
underlying concepts and relationships is usually unconscious, but that lack of conscious
acceptance only reinforces the illusion that what we know is natural and inevitable.
According to Hall, ideology pervades our mental frameworks through the concept of
“articulation,” the system of connections that makes it appear that two different elements
are unified. By conjuring up one association over another, a collection of coordinated
meanings can be invoked, overwhelming alternative conceptions and reinforcing the
meanings attributed by the associations.

***
Conclusion
This analysis of selected ABA Standards regulating curricula and faculty supports
Sonja Foss’s conclusion that the “dominant ideology controls what participants see as
natural or obvious by establishing the norm. . . . [and] provides a sense that things are the
way they have to be as it asserts that its meanings are the real, natural ones.” 9 Like
feminist and other critical theories, ideological rhetorical criticism aims to uncouple
connections and uncover embedded structures of authority. This is accomplished by
examining what we assume to be or implicitly accept as necessary connections between
and among the rhetorical elements and various systems and networks of beliefs. Equally
important, by illustrating how ideological commitments shape our ability to listen to and
6 Anne Makus, Stuart Hall’s Theory of Ideology: A Frame for Rhetorical Criticism, 54
WESTERN J. OF SPEECH COMM. 495, 495-507 (1990).
7 Id.
8 FOSS, supra note 5, at 239.
9 Foss, supra note 5, at 242.
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respond to others, the rhetorical critic hopes to foster more productive conversations
about the future.
In other words, because the primary goal of rhetorical criticism is to unveil the
dominant ideologies and describe the functions they serve, the act of disarming the
connections is the desired result. When implicit and unnecessary connections are severed,
alternatives become more possible and more open for discussion, even if achieving them
is not easily accomplished. For example, one promising alternative to the current ABA
Standards—“drafted along functional lines based on the policies to be fostered rather than
by establishing categories of faculty and setting out precise rules related to those
categories”—was described, but not recommended, in a report issued in 2008 by the
Special Committee on Security of Position appointed by the Section Chair. 10 The authors
recognized that an alternative might avoid “the current appearance of inequity” as the
“present rules accord different treatment to different faculty positions without any clearly
stated reasons for the distinctions.” Yet the report emphasized that it was only because
distinctive rules had been established for faculty outside the traditional tenure track that it
had become “possible to force some schools to move forward in their skills programs.”
Some progress has been made to better integrate expectations and requirements
and to provide reduced support for hierarchical frameworks. In August 2014, the ABA
House approved major revisions in the Standards, concluding a lengthy process
undertaken as the number of law applicants dropped and critiques of legal education
increased. Among those revisions was the elimination of the seventh-tenths ratio.
In addition, the amendments imposed a new graduation requirement of six credits
of coursework that is “primarily experiential in nature.” Under the new standard, the
experiential coursework must integrate doctrine, skills, and ethics; engage students in
performance of professional skills; develop the concepts underlying the professional
skills being taught; provide multiple opportunities for performance; and provide
opportunities for self-evaluation.
Few legal educators would argue with that utopian description. However, while
“substantive” courses (again using the category established by the ABA Standards) may
include experiential learning elements, the new experiential requirement explicitly states
that simulation, law clinic, and field placement courses are the only ones that will count.
Is this success or failure? If you approach the new requirement with the same
ironic sensibility we used to argue that the seven-tenths standard was good for clinical
and legal writing professors, the new requirement looks like success: more students will
have more opportunities for experiential learning; more clinical and legal writing
professors might be hired to teach those courses; and a few more might even be

10 See Report of the Special Committee on Security of Position, May 5, 2008 (available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/standards_review/comp_revi
ew_archive/special_committee_reports.html).
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converted to tenure-track positions because of the higher value now being placed on
experiential coursework.
But for those who are wary of unanticipated consequences—for those who worry
about creating, reflecting, and maintaining hierarchy—and for those who are inclined to
work to dismantle insupportable dichotomies in legal education today—the perspective is
different. For them, even if the new requirement looks like success, it is a success that
should be open to questioning.
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